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1Abstract
This paper tries to contribute to the strand of literature that inves-
tigates the question to what extend di®erences in per capita income be-
tween countries are due to di®erences in factor endowments like human-
and physical capital on the one hand and due to di®erences in technol-
ogy on the other hand. In particular, I am trying to assess to what
extend structural transformation, ie the ability of a country to specialize
in the production of goods that intensively use the factors with which it is
abundantly endowed, has an important role in determining cross country
income di®erences. I ¯nd that when productivities are country speci¯c,
for realistic parameter values structural transformation plays little role
and productivity di®erences between countries remain large. However,
when I allow for factor augmenting technology di®erences and factors are
complementary in sectoral production, there seem to be large di®erences
in the productivity of physical capital that are strongly correlated with
per capita income, while human capital seems to have an inverse hump
shape. This result is ad odds with Caselli (2005), who ¯nds that poor
countries use capital more e±ciently than rich countries, while having a
lower productivity of human capital. Finally, I use trade data and the
Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek equations to assess the plausibility of my calibra-
tions and ¯nd a good ¯t for the model with factor speci¯c productivities
and complementary factors.
21 Introduction
This paper tries to contribute to the strand of literature that investigates the
question to what extend di®erences in per capita income between countries are
due to di®erences in factor endowments like human- and physical capital on the
one hand and due to di®erences in technology on the other hand. In particular,
I am trying to assess to what extend structural transformation, that is the
ability of a country to specialize in the production of goods that intensively
use the factors with which it is abundantly endowed, has an important role
in determining cross country income di®erences. As Ventura (2005) notices
there is a strong point on the theoretical side that trade in the Heckscher-
Ohlin way is likely to increase the role of di®erences in factor endowments to
explain di®erences in per capita income. The intuition is that as long as a
country lies within a cone of diversi¯cation it does not experience decreasing
returns because its factor prices are determined by the aggregate endowments of
the countries in the cone. Consequently, the elasticity of substitution between
factors becomes in¯nite, and unbalanced factor endowments can lead to a much
higher per capita income than in a world without specialization. That implies
that there may be a less prominent role for technology di®erences in explaining
di®erences in per capita incomes. To study whether this theoretical channel
really is of quantitative importance, I develop a generalization of the standard
development accounting framework used by Hall and Jones (1999) and others
that nests the standard framework as a special case. In particular, I view
the world as one in which countries are connected by trade in goods, and in
which comparative advantage is determined by di®erences in countries' factor
endowments and in factor productivities.
In the paper I take two di®erent viewpoints of the world economy: In the
¯rst one technology is country speci¯c, while in the second one technology is
speci¯c to a factor located in a certain country.
I ¯nd that in the world with country speci¯c productivities structural trans-
formation is not quantitatively important and technology di®erences required to
explain di®erences in income remain large if the model is calibrated to produce
realistic labor shares. As a second overidentifying restriction I use trade data
and the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek equations. Trade data reject any model with
country speci¯c productivities including including the model developed by Hall
and Jones (1999). In the world with factor speci¯c productivities results depend
on whether inputs are complements or substitutes in production. If factors are
substitutes there is a positive relationship between the productivity of human
capital and income per worker, while the correlation between productivity of
physical capital and income per worker is negative. These ¯ndings are very sim-
ilar to Caselli's (2005). In this case there is no role for structural transformation
because there is no clear pattern of relative factor abundance in e±ciency units
and income per worker. On the other hand, when factors are complements
there is an inverse hump shaped relationship between the productivity of hu-
man capital and income per worker, so that medium income countries seem to
be the most productive in the use of human capital. The correlation between the
3productivity of physical capital and income per worker is found to be strongly
positive. In this case structural transformation important since rich countries
relatively more abundant in e±cient capital. This case is the preferred one be-
cause it is doing by far the best in matching measured and predicted °ows of
factors through trade in goods.
Let us now take a look at a very popular view of explaining cross country
per worker income di®erences in order for the reader to have a clearly in mind
where we are starting from. This view is a calibration view of explaining in-
come di®erences which has been used by King and Levine (1994), Klenow and
Rodriguez-Clare (1997), Prescott (1998) and Hall and Jones (1999) and Caselli
(2005). A common result of this approach is that factor endowments cannot
explain a large part of income di®erences. This approach has been extended to
factor speci¯c productivity di®erences by Caselli (2005).
1.1 A Popular View of The World
1.1.1 The Hall and Jones World
a) A number of in°uential papers have adopted a calibration approach to ex-
plaining cross country income di®erences. In their viewpoint, the relationship
between a countries' inputs and outputs can be described by an aggregate Cobb-
Douglas production function. Let me call this way of thinking about cross




Here Yc is the Gross Domestic Product of country c, Hc and Kc are country
c's endowments of human capital and physical capital, ® is the capital share
and Ac is total factor productivity in country c. Given data on endowments and
GDP productivities required to make the left hand side equal to the right hand
side are calibrated. Hall and Jones (and others following this approach) obtain
the following results: 1) cross country di®erences in Ac are large and 2) strongly
positively correlated with income per worker (Corr(Ac; Yc
Lc) >> 0). This can
be seen clearly from Figure 1 which plots countries' calibrated productivities
against their incomes per worker for the year 1992 in constant 1987 International
Dollars.1 Consequently, Hall and Jones conclude that di®erences in country
productivities are very important in explaining cross country income di®erences.
1.1.2 The Caselli World
In his chapter on Development Accounting in the Handbook of Economic Growth,
Caselli (2005) presents a di®erent model in order to describe the relationship




which is an accounting view point of
explaining income di®erences, because some part of di®erences in capital stocks may actually
be due to di®erences in productivity, a result that follows from any neoclassical growth model.
Hall and Jones (1999) control for this by writing output as a function of the capital output
ratio which is invariant to productivity in the steady state.
4between a country's income and its endowments, namely he makes productiv-
ities factor speci¯c. Let me call this model the Caselli world. In this world
production functions have the following form
Yc = [®(AK;cKc)
²¡1





where AHc is the e±ciency of human capital in country c and AKc is the pro-
ductivity of physical capital in the same country.
Caselli's main ¯ndings are the following ones: 1) di®erences in AH;c are large
and every unit of human capital is much more e±cient in rich countries than in
poor countries (Corr(AHc; Yc
Lc) >> 0). Figure 2 plots calibrated productivities
of human capital from this model for ² = 0:82 against income per worker under
the assumption that the labor share is the empirical one.
2) Di®erences in AK;c are also signi¯cant and poor countries use each unit of
physical capital more e±ciently in absolute terms than rich countries (Corr(AKc; Yc
Lc)
<< 0). Figure 3 shows the negative relationship between the e±ciency of phys-
ical capital and per capita income. It seems a bit counterintuitive, though, that
placing a machine in Subsaharian Africa, should - all else equal - generate more
output than in the United States.
In this paper I will present a somewhat more general view of the world, that
includes the Hall and Jones world and the Caselli world as special cases and I
will test the robustness of their ¯ndings to relaxing some of their assumptions.
Especially, I allow for structural transformation as a mechanism in explaining
income di®erences.
1.2 Outline of Paper
The outline of the paper is as follows: In the next section I develop a theoretical
model of the world economy with Heckscher-Ohlin trade and factor speci¯c pro-
ductivities and show how factor productivities can be recovered from the model
when data on countries' endowments and factor prices are fed in. In addition I
show that standard models of development accounting obtain as special cases of
the model, when the role of structural change is eliminated because all sectors
have the same factor intensities. Subsequently I discuss how the Heckscher-
Ohlin-Vanek equations can be used in this framework to evaluate calibrated
productivities. This is followed by a presentation of the results of calibrating
country- and factor-speci¯c productivities in my framework. The last section
concludes.
2 Theory
In order to formalize the idea that trade in the Heckscher-Ohlin form may be
important for calibrating productivities I develop a °exible benchmark model
of the world economy that relies on the following assumptions:
2The form of the productivity di®erences is not sensitive to the choice of ².
5Assumption 1): Countries are open to trade in goods and possess perfectly
competitive goods and factor markets.
Assumption 2): Factors are immobile between countries and perfectly mobile
within countries.
Assumption 3): Each country is endowed with human capital Hc and physical
capital Kc.3
Assumption 4): Productivity is speci¯c to a factor located in a country.
Assumption 5): All individuals in all countries have identical homothetic pref-
erences that can be described by a Cobb-Douglas utility function.
Note that the existence of perfect factor markets is implicitly assumed both
in the Hall and Jones and the Caselli world because this guarantees e±cient
allocation of inputs. 4 Neither Hall and Jones nor Caselli make an explicit
statement about goods trade but nothing in their models excludes this possibil-
ity. Capital mobility is not assumed away explicitly in their models, while there
must be some barriers to the movement of people in order to explain di®erences
in per capita incomes. Finally, Assumption 4) is Caselli's assumption about
technology and Assumption 5)is not necessary in the Hall and Jones or in the
Caselli world.
The model is then easily described by Assumptions A1)-A5) and the spec-
i¯cation of preferences and technology: There are c = 1;:::;C countries, each
of which possesses the technologies to produce i = 1;:::;I goods. Consumers'










¾i = 1 (4)
Sectors use inputs Hic and Kic and di®er by their capital intensity for given
factor prices. In each country productivity is speci¯c to factors: AKc, AHc.
Sectoral production functions are CES5.
Qic = [®i(AKcKic)
²¡1





3Following the growth literature the factor "human capital" is measured as labor endow-
ments in e±ciency units, which is di®erent from the convention used in the trade literature,
where human capital is usually the amount of skilled labor. Because the model has only two
factors this seems to be the adequate way to measure labor endowments.
4See Banerjee and Du°o (2005) for a model with imperfect factor markets which causes
aggregate production to depend on the distribution of factor endowments within the economy.
5The assumption that elasticities of substitution are the same across sectors rules out
factor intensity reversals. I have solved the model also for the more general assumption ² = ²i
without getting any signi¯cantly di®erent results. Hence, I maintain the hypothesis of equal
sectoral elasticities for reasons that will become clear later.
6For convenience, I de¯ne the following variables:
^ Hc = AHcHc (6)









These are factor endowments in e±ciency units and e±ciency adjusted factor
prices. So, for example, one unit of e±cient capital is equivalent to AKc units
of plain capital, and one unit of e±cient capital, which is measured in common
units across countries, costs 1
AK;c as much as one unit of plain capital, which may
di®er in e±ciency across countries. Capital prices in country c may be higher
than in country c' because buying one unit of capital in country c provides
ownership of more e±cient units of capital or because capital is more scarce in
country c.
With these renormalization of variables I am able to describe the world econ-
omy as an ordinary Heckscher-Ohlin model without productivity di®erences in
which factor endowments are measured in e±ciency units, while leaving the
structure of the model formally equivalent to the one described by the produc-
tion possibilities and preferences above. Because a country's production is not
uniquely de¯ned in a Heckscher-Ohlin model for any country lying within any
set of countries that has common factor prices (a so called cone of diversi¯ca-
tion) and produces a number of goods greater than the number of factors, let
me make the following de¯nition:
De¯nition: Let D be a partition of C s.t.
TD







Given this, one can de¯ne a competitive equilibrium in the usual way:
De¯nition: A Competitive Equilibrium (CE) is a collection of goods prices
fpigI
i=1, e±ciency adjusted wages f ^ wcgC
c=1, e±ciency adjusted rental rates f^ rcgC
c=1
and quantities fQi;dgD
d=1 s.t. given a cross section of e±ciency adjusted human
capital endowments f ^ HcgC
c=1, e±ciency adjusted physical capital endowments
f ^ KcgC
c=1, and parameters ², f®igI
i=1 and f¾igI
i=1 the following system of equa-
tion holds for all d 2 D:
pi · [®²
i^ r1¡²







c + (1 ¡ ®i)² ^ w1¡²
c ]
1
1¡²gQi;d = 0 (11)
7(A good is not produced in a set of countries with equal conditional factor





c + (1 ¡ ®i)² ^ w1¡²
c ]
²

























( ^ wc ^ Hc + ^ rc ^ Kc) (14)






)¾i = 1; (15)
(Optimal price index)
To illustrate what e®ects trade and structural change may have on income
di®erences, and what can go wrong if one neglects these e®ects let us take a
look at a simple example that can be solved analytically:
2.1 An Example
Assume that sectoral input ratios are su±ciently extreme and expenditure on
sectors with extreme factor proportions is large enough in order for conditional
factor price equalization to hold for the world economy, i.e. ^ wc = ^ wc0 = ^ w and
^ rc = ^ rc0 = ^ r 8c 2 C. In this case, the open economy equilibrium replicates the
equilibrium of the integrated economy, which is a hypothetical economy in which
all impediments to factor movements between countries have been abolished.
Hence, it su±ces to look at the equilibrium of the integrated economy. For
analytical tractability assume that ² ! 1 so that sectoral production is Cobb-
Douglas. From ¯rms' ¯rst order condition for pro¯t maximization we have:
^ w ^ Hi = (1 ¡ ®i)piQi (16)
Since demand is Cobb-Douglas, the expenditure on good i is given by
piQi = ¾iEw = ¾iYw; (17)
8where Ew and Yw are expenditure and income of the world economy. Then from
factor market clearing for human capital we get that






(1 ¡ ®i)piQi: (18)
Combining these equations we obtain sectoral factor use in terms of the aggre-
gate factor endowments of the world economy.
^ Hi =




















Now, plugging in the de¯nition of the sectoral production functions, one obtains.





















This implies that the world economy behaves as if it had an aggregate Cobb-
Douglas production function and there are decreasing returns to factor accu-
mulation in e±ciency units at the world level. World factor prices are given
by






















Consequently, factor prices are determined at the world level and to the extend
that they are given for individual countries, country production functions are
linear and countries experience constant returns to factor accumulation. Rela-





^ Hc ^ w + ^ Kc^ r
^ Hc0 ^ w + ^ Kc0^ r
; (27)


































Now, several things can be learned from these formulas. Assume for a mo-
ment that the variables are de¯ned in ordinary units and are not e±ciency
adjusted. First, to the extend that world factor prices are not a®ected by a
single country, the elasticity of substitution between factors is in¯nite in the
factor price equalization case because countries absorb additional factor inputs
through structural transformation, i.e. a change of sectoral output holding con-
stant the input ratios in each sector. Then, rich countries may escape decreasing
returns to capital by producing above all capital intensive goods. In this case
factor endowments would explain more of cross country income di®erences than
in the Hall and Jones world. Second, relative incomes depend on the produc-
tion and demand structure of the whole world economy and not only on the
production technology of the two countries that are being compared. Third, if
the correlation between expenditure shares ¾i and sectoral capital shares ®i is
positive, di®erences in capital have more weight and will cause larger di®erences
in income.
This example, of course, only gives some hints how trade may a®ect cali-
brated productivity di®erences because factor price equalization clearly does not
hold for the world economy and productivity di®erences may be factor speci¯c.
Given factor productivities for every country CE de¯nes the equilibrium of
the world economy. However, e±ciency adjusted factor endowments are un-
known, since they consist of factor endowments multiplied by the unknown
factor e±ciencies. Therefore, some additional information is required in order
to calibrate country speci¯c factor productivities. This information comes in
form of data on country wages, wc, and rental rates rc, which allow me to solve
for the 2C unknowns fAK;cgC
c=1, fAH;cgC
c=1. The procedure applied is analogue
to the usual calibration exercise a la Hall and Jones or Caselli, just that on the
way of calibrating productivities also the unknown equilibrium prices and pro-
duction levels in each country have to be determined, because the relationship
between a countries' inputs and outputs depends on endowments and prefer-
ences of the whole world economy. In order to formalize this idea a bit, let me
make the following de¯nition:
De¯nition: A Productivity Calibration Problem with Factor Augmenting Pro-
ductivities (FAP) is a collection of goods prices fpigI
i=1, e±ciency adjusted
10wages f ^ wcgC
c=1, e±ciency adjusted rental rates f^ rcgC
c=1, quantities fQi;dgD
d=1
and sectoral productivities fAH;cgC
c=1, fAH;cgC
c=1 such that given a cross sec-
tion of human capital endowments fHcgC




c=1 and parameters f®igI
i=1, ² and f¾igI
i=1 the following
system of equations holds for all d 2 D:
pi · [®²
i^ r1¡²







c + (1 ¡ ®i)² ^ w1¡²
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1





c + (1 ¡ ®i)² ^ w1¡²
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²






































Regarding uniqueness and the relationship between the Competitive Equilib-
rium and Productivity Calibration Problem with Factor Augmenting Productiv-
ities one can prove the following (for the proofs see Appendix):







i=1, we have that fpigI










c=1 = f ^ KcgC
c=1.
Lemma 1 means that any solution to the FAP is actually an equilibrium
of the world economy if we had known the productivities beforehand, which is
obviously a necessary condition for the concept of FAP to make sense.
Lemma 2: If given fHcgC
c=1, fKcgC
c=1, f®igI
i=1, ² and f¾igI














11Lemma 2 implies that prices and quantities of the CE of a Heckscher-Ohlin
model in which all factor endowments are measured in e±ciency units will also
be a FAP and measured productivity di®erences will be zero. This (together
with the following proposition) implies that when actual productivity di®erences
are absent, FAP will also predict that all productivities are the same for all
countries.
Proposition 1: The Productivity Calibration Problem with Factor Augmenting
Productivities has a unique solution given given any cross section of human capi-
tal endowments fHcgC




c=1 and parameters f®igI
i=1, ² and f¾igI
i=1.
Now, after having made sure that the concept of FAP makes sense, it is
insightful to explore a bit the relationship between this model and the standard
development accounting framework. In fact, when all sectors use the same factor
intensities, such that there is no possibility of adjusting production patterns to
relative factor endowments through structural change, the model collapses to
Caselli's model of factor speci¯c productivities.
Assumption 6): All sectors have identical factor intensities: ®i = ®j = ®,
8i;j 2 I
Given this assumption it follows from the pricing equations (30) that pi =
pj ´ p. Then the equation for the price index (35) pins down p = 1. 6 Hence
1 = [®²^ r1¡²
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²




Qi;c = AH;cHc (39)
[®²^ r1¡²







Qi;c = AK;cKc (40)
Consequently:









Then using (36) and (37) and substituting these expressions for ^ wc, ^ rc we are












6This shows that only in this special case the demand side of the economy does not matter
because relative goods prices are pinned down from the production side and are equal to one.













These two expressions are just Caselli's (2005) result for development ac-
counting with factor augmenting productivities.
If one drops Assumption 6) and instead assumes that productivities are not
factor- but country-speci¯c, one obtains a another model.
Assumption 7) : AH;c = AK;c = Ac.
In this case one data point per country in addition to the factor endowments
is su±cient to determine Ac and this is taken to be aggregate income Yc. In
this case the model is de¯ned as follows:
A Productivity Calibration Problem with Country Productivities (CAP) is a col-
lection of goods prices fpigI
i=1, e±ciency adjusted wages f ^ wcgC
c=1, e±ciency
adjusted rental rates f^ rcgC
c=1, country productivities fAgC
c=1 and quantities
fQi;dgD
d=1 s.t. given a cross section of human capital endowments fHcgC
c=1,
physical capital fKcgC
c=1, Gross Domestic Products fYcgC
c=1 and parameters
f®igI
i=1, ² and f¾igI
i=1 the following system of equation holds for all d 2 D:
pi · [®²
i^ r1¡²







c + (1 ¡ ®i)² ^ w1¡²
c ]
1





c + (1 ¡ ®i)² ^ w1¡²
c ]
²





























)¾i = 1; (49)
Ac =
Yc
^ wcHc + ^ rcKc
(50)
Proposition 2: The Productivity Calibration Problem with Country Augmenting
Productivities (CAP) has a unique solution given any cross section of human
capital endowments fHcgC
c=1, physical capital fKcgC
c=1, Gross Domestic Prod-
ucts fYcgC
c=1, and parameters f®igI
i=1, ² and f¾igI
i=1.
13Again, if one adds Assumption 6) that all sectors have identical factor in-
tensities: ®i = ®j = ® 8i;j 2 I , it follows from the pricing equations and
the price index that pi = p = 1. Then, combining the factor market clearing
conditions, we have that:









Combining this with the pricing equation
1 = [®²^ r1¡²




we obtain two equations that can be solved for ^ wc and ^ rc. Finally, using the
fact that Ac = Yc













If one makes the additional assumption that production is Cobb-Douglas, one
¯nally gets back to the Hall & Jones world.
Assumption 8): ² = 1








3 Testing the Results with Trade Data
Both the CAP and the FAP provide unique productivity calibrations for given
values f®igI
i=1, ² and f¾igI
i=1. Hence, a way to determine reasonable values of
those parameters is required. However, the model is too stylized for one wanting
to associate the sectors in the model with empirical sectoral classi¯cations, like
SIC-aggregates. In addition, these empirically measured classi¯cations aggre-
gate goods according to similar uses (like textiles, electrical machinery) and not
according to their factor intensities, which would be the relevant classi¯cation
in a Heckscher-Ohlin model.
Therefore, in order to get an idea which parameter values may be reason-
able, I use the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) equations to evaluate the ¯t of
the model. These equations, which can be derived from any Heckscher-Ohlin
stile model state a theoretical identity between the predicted and the measured
factor content of trade. The testable hypothesis is that a country should export
(through trade in goods) the services of those factors with which it is abundantly
endowed relative to the world average and export its relatively scarce factors.
Assuming that there is no trade in intermediate goods, the factor content of
trade can be written as follows: Let f = 1;:::F denote factors, i = 1;:::;I denote
goods and let Bc be the F*I factor use matrix in country c, with elements bf;i;c
determining the use of factor f in the production of one unit of good i in country
14c and rows Bf;c, that ¯x the use of factor f per unit of output in each sector. Let
Dc ´ Bc(I ¡Ec)¡1 be the matrix of direct plus indirect factor inputs, where Ec
is country c's input-output matrix. Then in the above models, the use of human
capital in the production of one unit of good i in country f is, for example
bf;i;c = p²
i ^ w¡²
c (1 ¡ ®i)¡²=AH;c; (55)
and the fth row of the factor use matrix of the United States is
Bf;US = ^ w
¡²
USBf=Af;US; (56)
where Bf is common to all countries because of free and costless trade. The
factor use matrix in country c can be expressed as a function of the one of the
US.










Normalizing Af;US = 1, the measured factor content of trade is de¯ned as:
MFC¤
















where Qc is country c's net production, Ccc0 is country c's consumption of goods
produced in country c' (imports of c from c') and Xc are country c's exports.
On the other hand, using the additional assumption that Ccc0 = scQc0 7, one
can write the predicted factor content of trade as:
PFC¤








Using factor market clearing, which implies DcQc = Vc, we get
PFC¤
f = Af;cVf;c ¡ scAf;cVf;c ¡
X
c06=c




7This relation is not strictly implied by the Heckscher-Ohlin model, where bilateral trade
is usually not determined, but would follow for example from any increasing returns (see
Helpman and Krugman (1985))or Armington-model. One could think of each sector as pro-
ducing in fact a number of country speci¯c varieties of goods and that sector demands are,
for example, a CES- aggregate over sectoral varieties. The assumption is nevertheless usu-
ally made in the literature, because if there is no factor price equalization it is the only way
to make the predicted factor content of trade depend only on factor endowments. Another
way to justify this assumption would be to rely on random matching between importers and
exporters(Deardor® (1998)).





Df;US into MFCf;c I get a rela-
tionship that can be checked on the data.
Since the HOV-equations apply to the FAP- and the CAP-models, it can
be tested for which parameter values of technology and absorbtion they best ¯t
observed trade data.
To test the ¯t of my productivity calibrations, I just plug the e±ciency
adjusted factor prices measured relative to the value of the US into (58) and
the calibrated relative factor productivities into (60). I report the results of
the following tests that are standard in the literature.8 First, I report the Sign
Test that measures the fraction of observations for which the predicted and the
measured factor content of trade have the same sign. I also report results of the
Weighted Sign Test which weights observation by the magnitude of factor °ows,
giving more weight to large °ows. Third, I include slope coe±cient and R2 of
a regression of the measured factor content on the predicted factor content of
trade, which have a theoretical value of one in the case of perfect ¯t.Finally,
I provide results of the "Missing Trade"-Test, that is the ratio of the variance
of the measured factor content to the variance of the predicted factor content,
which should be close to one if magnitudes of predicted and measured factor
°ows are similar.
Even though the Hall and Jones world and Caselli's Factor Augmenting
Productivity-Model can be seen as special cases of the Heckscher-Ohlin model
with country-/factor speci¯c productivity di®erences in which all sectors use
the same input ratios (see above), the HOV-equations cannot be used to test
the productivity calibrations obtained from those models. When all sectors
use exactly the same input ratios, trade patterns and hence factor trade are
completely undetermined, because it does not matter whether a country pro-
duces a good or imports it, but in¯nitesimal trade costs should be enough to
generate zero trade. Because the prediction of zero trade can be dismissed as
counterfactual, since countries obviously trade a lot of goods, it does not seem
too unreasonable, to assume that there is for example an underlying increas-
ing return or Armington model, which predicts that every country imports a
fraction of goods from every other country. Hence, the standard development
accounting models cannot be tested with the HOV-equations, but they can be
tested together with the assumption that every country imports a fraction of
goods from every other country.
4 Data
In order to allow direct comparison of my results with the literature on devel-
opment accounting, I construct data in the way suggested by Caselli (2005).
Because I have trade data for the year 1992, I compute physical capital stocks
in constant 1987 international Dollars from the Penn World Tables (Mark 6.1)9.
8For a more detailed description of these tests see, for example, Davis and Weinstein (2003).
9For details see Caselli (2005).
16GDPs in constant 1987 international Dollars are also computed from the same
source. Endowments of human capital are taken directly from Caselli's dataset.
Even though his dataset is for 1996 this should not matter much, since educa-
tional attainments change very slowly.
Since I need an additional data point per country in order to calibrate factor
productivities, I construct estimates of average unskilled wages for the 94 coun-
tries in the sample. In order to get wage data, I proceed in the following way. As
a ¯rst step I use data on country labor shares from Bernanke and Guerkaynak
(2001). Following a procedure suggested by Gollin (2002), they have adjusted
raw data on labor shares for the labor of self-employed workers, who make up
a large fraction of the labor force in most developing countries. Because their
dataset includes only 54 countries of my sample, I regress these labor shares
on controls and predict labor shares out of sample for the rest of the countries.
Right hand side variables include trade openness and regional dummies.




For the countries for which no observations of the labor share are available:




Once labor shares are constructed for all countries, wages are computed as
wc =
SH;cYc
Hc , where SH;c is the labor share in country C. Rental rates are then
just computed as rc = Yc¡wcHc
Kc . Figures 4) to 6) depict labor shares, wages and
rentals for the countries in the sample. Labor shares are weakly positively cor-
related with income per worker, while wages are, as expected strongly positively
correlated with per worker income. The country with the lowest observation for
wages is 372 Dollars for Zaire, while the highest wage is observed for Italy with
12194 Dollars for workers with no education. Measured rentals, on the other
hand, vary inversely with per capita income. The lowest rental, 6%, is observed
for Romania, while the highest one, 138%, is calculated for Uganda.
For the trade data I use the dataset compiled by Antweiler & Tre°er (2002)
because it consists of a fairly large sample of countries at all stages of devel-
opment (71). 64 of these countries form a subset of the countries for which I
have data on human capital. The data include observations for bilateral trade
at the level of 37 SIC sectors and the technology matrix of the US at intervals of
¯ve years, starting 1972 and ending 1992. I use 1992 trade data and adjust the
factor use matrix of the US to ¯t my endowment data which are signi¯cantly
di®erent from Tre°er's.
175 Calibrating Productivities
5.1 Country Speci¯c Productivities
When productivities are speci¯c to countries, GDPs are taken as additional data
points in order to ¯nd unknown productivities.
To ¯x ideas, let me focus on the CAP with 2 industries, i 2 fH;Kg with
®H < ®K. Hence, countries can lie either in the cone of diversi¯cation and
have factor prices that are equalized in e±ciency units, so that di®erences in
factor prices re°ect only di®erences in country productivities, or they specialize
in the production of one of the goods. In this case their factor prices re°ect both
di®erences in productivity and di®erences in factor endowments. The model is
solved simultaneously for specialization patterns, productions, factor- and goods
prices and productivities. 10
The examples shown in this section are supposed to be representative of the
di®erent cases that can arise in the model.
As a starting point let us have a look at an example where the role of
structural transformation is potentially very large. This happens when sectoral
input ratios are extreme, so that additional units of inputs will be absorbed
mainly by an expansion of the output produced by the sector that uses the
factor intensively. A second requirement for structural change to be important
is that the demand for capital intensive goods is su±ciently large, so that capital
abundant countries can concentrate on producing this good, while the small and
capital scarce rest of the world delivers labor abundant products.
Example 1) ®H = 0:001, ®K = 0:999, ¾H = 0:2, ² = 1
In this example 80% of income are spent on the capital intensive good, which
use virtually only capital. It is obvious from ¯gure ? that productivities are
hardly related to per worker income and that middle income countries have
on average the highest productivities. In this example conditional factor price
equalization holds on the world level. Hence, di®erences in factor prices re°ect
only productivity di®erences. Rich countries do not require high productivities
to be richer because they use their capital e±ciently by specializing in capital
intensive products, while their demand for labor intensive products is satis¯ed
mainly by poorer countries. The model shows poor ¯t of the HOV-equations,
since measured and predicted trade °ows have the same direction only in around
40 per cent of observations (see table 1). Another major drawback of this
calibration is, that it is unable to replicate factor shares. In fact, large trends
in factor shares are predicted. Figure? plots labor shares against income per
worker. With Cobb-Douglas production rich countries have very small labor
shares because they produce mainly the capital intensive good and the reverse
holds for poor countries. In order to ¯x the prediction of large trends in factor
shares, either sectoral input ratios must be very similar, which eliminates the
10I have solved also models with more than 2 goods, that have potentially several cones of
diversi¯cation. While these models are somewhat more cumbersome to solve because individ-
ual countries' productions may be indeterminate, results obtained from those models are very
similar to the 2 goods case.
18possibility of structural transformation or inputs must be complements which
raises the price of the scarce factor and increases its income share.
Example 2) ®H = 0:3, ®K = 0:4, ¾H = 0:2, ² = 1 In this example sectoral
input ratios are more similar for given factor prices. This implies that trends
in income shares become less pronounced (for countries that specialize income
shares are given by the relevant sectoral factor shares). At the same time,
however, the power of structural change is eliminated because even though the
production structure di®ers across countries because of specialization, sectoral
technologies are too similar for countries to be able to escape decreasing returns
to capital accumulation.
The force of the law of decreasing returns can be mitigated when the sectoral
elasticity of substution is allowed to be larger than one, but some trends in factor
shares remain whenever structural change is powerfully at work.
Models with complementary inputs give rise to positive correlations between
factor shares and per capita income that also can hardly be eliminated because
with complementary inputs sectoral input ratios must di®er more in order for
structural change to work. Consequently, it must be concluded that the model
with country speci¯c productivities ¯ts the data poorly.
But also the Hall and Jones model does not ¯t the data well. Of course,
income shares ¯t by construction but this model does poorly in ¯tting trade
data. As explained above, in the Hall and Jones world trade must arise for some
reasons other than factor proportions. Given the assumption that each country
imports a fraction of production of each other country, there will, however, still
be trade in factors. The model does very poorly in ¯tting the HOV equations.
Only for 25% of observations of capital °ows predicted and measured °ows have
the same direction and also for human capital, the model does more poorly than
a coin toss in predicting factor °ows.
It seems, hence, that models with country speci¯c productivities are not a
very good description of the real world. Let us therefore have a look at the
model with factor speci¯c productivities.
Sign Weighted Sign ¯ R2 Missing Trade
K 0.3906 0.3919 -0.0013 0.0013 0.0012
Example 1 H 0.3438 0.367 -0.0834 0.008 0.8674
K 0.25 0.3769 -0.0101 0.0171 0.0059
Example 2 H 0.5625 0.4486 0.1892 0.024 1.4922
K 0.25 0.3787 -0.0108 0.0163 0.0071
H.J. H 0.5156 0.4376 0.1563 0.0149 1.6451
5.2 Factor Speci¯c Productivities
When productivities are factor speci¯c the model ¯ts factor shares by construc-
tion for any parameter values.
In this section there are again 2 traded goods, the H-good and the K-good,
with ®H < ®K. In this model it is important to distinguish whether physical
19and human capital are complements or substitutes in sectoral production. Let
us ¯rst take a look of substitutable inputs (² > 1)
5.2.1 Substitutable Inputs
Example 1) ®H = 0:1, ®K = 0:9, ¾H = 0:5, ² = 1:5. In this case there is hardly
any di®erence between the open economy and Caselli's way to calibrate factor
productivities. There is a strong positive correlation between the productiv-
ity of human capital, which varies between 2 and 140 per cent of US-human
capital productivity, and per capita GDP. On the other hand, there is a neg-
ative correlation between the productivity of physical capital and per capita
GDP. The poorest countries seem to utilize capital up to 12 times more e±-
ciently than the US. In equilibrium all countries are inside the cone and the
relative abundance of physical capital of rich countries disappears when factors
are measured in e±ciency units. If anything, poor countries are somewhat more
capital abundant on average (see ¯gure ??). Consequently, structural change
has no power to explain income di®erences because production patterns do not
vary systematically across countries. Since all countries produce both goods,
conditional factor prices are equalized. Because wc is much higher in rich coun-
tries than in poor ones and because AHc = wc= ^ w, a high AH is needed in rich
countries in order to match wage data. Exactly the opposite is true for poor
countries. In addition, as rc is lower in rich countries and because AKc = rc=^ rc,
AKc needs to be relatively low in rich countries. The reason for conditional
factor price equalization is that relative e±cient factor abundance does not vary
much across countries in equilibrium so that rich countries are just upscaled
versions of poor countries. When ² > 1 the wage is a positive function of AH,
and the rental a positive function of AK because the e±cient factor has a high











H;c :) This explains the positive correlation between
AH and per worker income and the negative correlation between AK and the
same variable. The fact that productivities are so close to the ones in Caselli's
world can also be explained by the way the data are constructed: Since for


































The ¯t of the HOV-equations of this model is poor. Only in 37,5% of ob-
servations for capital °ows do measured and predicted capital °ows have the
same direction and also all the other measures of ¯t do very poorly. The picture
remains the same for °ows of human capital, for which the value of the sign test
is roughly 0.3. The reason for the poor ¯t is that because of conditional factor
price equalization rich countries are now measured to export hardly any capital,
while they are predicted to export a lot. The measured human capital content
of trade, on the other hand is larger than the predicted one, even though it
remains small in absolute terms.
20The result that productivities are very similar to the ones in the Caselli
world obtains as long as conditional factor price equalization holds. In over to
overturn it, some specialization is needed. Specialization occurs when sectoral
input ratios are not too di®erent and the elasticity of substitution is relatively
small.
Example 2) ®H = 0:5, ®K = 0:6, ¾H = 0:5, ² = 1:2 Now 47 countries spe-
cialize in the capital intensive good, 42 countries lie in the cone and 4 countries
specialize in the human capital intensive good. The general pattern of productiv-
ities remains similar but human capital productivity is somewhat less correlated
with per worker income and the correlation between per worker income and the
productivity of physical capital is less negative. Countries specializing in the
capital intensive good have higher e±cient wages and lower e±cient rentals and
therefore have lower AHcs and higher AKcs than with conditional factor price
equalization. The ¯t of the HOV equations improve for the direction of trade
°ows for the factor physical capital, while remaining much too small in magni-
tude. For human capital the ¯t remains poor. Now many poor countries have
lower e±cient rentals and higher e±cient wages, so that their exports are pre-
dicted to contain more capital and their imports human capital than in example
1).
Summarizing, one can say that if factors are relatively good substitutes in
sectoral production, rich countries seem to be relatively abundant in e±cient
human capital and there is a clear positive correlation between per capita GDP
and the e±ciency of human capital, while there is a negative relation between
per capita GDP and the e±ciency of physical capital, that may be weakened as
the elasticity decreases. Note however, that when the productivity of physical
capital is higher in poor countries and human capital is more e±ciently used in
rich countries, the ¯t of the HOV equations is unsatisfying because poor coun-
tries are measured to export labor and import capital and the predicted factor
content has just the opposite sign. Also structural change (in the sense that
as countries accumulate physical capital, their production patterns switch from
labor to capital intensive goods) plays no role in explaining income di®erences
because the model predicts that poor countries are capital abundant in e±-
ciency units, implying that they export capital intensive goods while importing
labor intensive ones. Let us now turn to the case in which sectoral inputs are
complements in production (² < 1).
5.2.2 Complementary Inputs
Example 3) ®H = 0:2, ®K = 0:8, ¾H = 0:4, ² = 0:6 In this case, the 19 richest
countries specialize in the capital intensive good, 11 middle income countries
are in the cone and 64 countries produce only the human capital intensive good.
With complementary inputs results are very di®erent from Caselli's world.
Now the relationship between AHc and income per worker is inverse hump
shaped, so that the productivity of human capital is highest for medium in-
come countries. On the other hand, the correlation between AKc and per
capita income becomes strictly positive, just the opposite of Caselli's result!
21In this world, rich countries are abundant in e±cient capital, while poor coun-
tries are abundant in e±cient human capital. The simple link between factor
productivities and factor prices that obtains within a conditional factor price
equalization set, where factor prices and productivities are positively related,
is broken by specialization. Instead, the sectoral prediction that factor prices
and factor e±ciencies are inversely related, prevails. The intuition is, that with
complementary inputs, the ine±cient input is expensive because it is scarce in
e±ciency units and required in production. So high wages imply relatively low
e±ciencies of human capital. Conversely, low rentals imply relatively higher
productivities of physical capital. Hence, the relationship between factor prices
and factor productivities is non-monotonic and depends on in which of the 3
possible sets of specialization countries lie.
The ¯t of the HOV of this particular model is relatively poor for physical
capital but reasonably good for human capital. Since poor countries have rela-
tively low e±cient wages and high e±cient rentals, their exports are measured
to contain a lot of human capital and little physical capital. The reverse holds
for rich countries. On the other hand, predicted factor trade, does not seem
to coincide in magnitude, even though given productivities, poor countries are
more human capital abundant and less abundant in physical capital than rich
ones.
Example 4) ®H = 0:1, ®K = 0:6, ¾H = 0:4, ² = 0:8
This example is similar to the previous one in qualitative terms, just the
magnitudes of productivity di®erences are much larger in this example. This
improves the ¯t of the HOV-equations signi¯cantly, as the size of the predicted
factor content of trade becomes larger. The ¯t for physical capital is reasonably
good, even though the model still measures to little trade in capital, while the
¯t for human capital is very good with respect to all tests. The intuition for the
good ¯t of the HOV equations is the following. When factors are complements
rich countries have high e±cient wages and low e±cient rentals, because they
specialize in the capital intensive good. Consequently, they use a lot of capital
and little human capital per unit of output and are measured to export a lot
of capital and to import human capital. When rich countries have high capital
productivities they are very capital abundant in e±ciency units and therefore
are also predicted to export capital. The reverse holds for poorer countries.
For human capital, on the other hand, rich countries are measured to import a
lot of the factor, while with relatively low productivities of human capital they
are also predicted to do so. At the same time, middle income countries are
measured to be very abundant in human capital, exporting a lot of this factor,
which they are also measured to do because of relatively low e±cient wages.
At this point it is also interesting to check how Caselli's productivities ¯t
the trade data. As can be seen in table two where I report results for ² = 0:3,
the parameter for which Caselli's productivities have the best ¯t, this model
does very poorly in predicting trade °ows. The reason is that in this model rich
countries have relatively high e±cient wages and low e±cient rentals, so that
their exports are measured to contain lots of capital and little human capital,
while on the other hand, rich countries are predicted to export little capital
22because they are not so abundant in this factor due to low productivities, and
to import little human capital because they are abundant in e±ciency units.
Summarizing, when factors are complements, two stable patterns emerge:
The productivity of human capital seems to be hump shaped when plotted
against income per worker, with medium income countries exhibiting highest
productivity levels of this factors. Second, there is a clear positive correlation
between the productivity of physical capital and income per worker. In this
environment structural change is important because countries that are capital
abundant when capital is measured in PPP dollars are also capital abundant
in e±ciency units and specialize in the good that uses their abundant factor
intensively. The magnitude of productivity di®erences depends on parameter
values and gets larger as ² approaches one from below. The best ¯t of the HOV
equations is achieved with implausibly large productivity di®erences. This may
be due to the fact, that the model predicts too much trade, because in deriving
the HOV equations it was assumed that every country imports a fraction of
every other country's output that is proportional to its relative size in the world
economy.
Sign Weighted Sign ¯ R2 Missing Trade
K 0.375 0.3801 -0.0006 0.0012 0.0004
Example 1 H 0.2969 0.3078 -0.1404 0.0057 3.6406
K 0.5469 0.8763 0.0242 0.3839 0.0015
Example 2 H 0.2813 0.2689 -0.8458 0.1190 6.0150
K 0.3594 0.4079 -0.1544 0.3204 0.0744
Example 3 H 0.6406 0.6369 0.8654 0.4606 1.63
K 0.8125 0.5503 0.1068* 0.0656* 0.2644
Example 4 H 0.8125 0.7614 0.783 0.5332 1.1504
Caselli K 0.5000 0.5407 0.0042 0.1090 0.0002
² = 0:3 H 0.2969 0.2990 -0.5805 0.0710 4.7520
6 Conclusion
This paper has developed a quantitative Heckscher-Ohlin model of the world
economy with country and factor speci¯c productivities in order to address the
question how much of cross country income di®erences are due to di®erential
factor endowments and what kind of technology di®erences are necessary to
explain the observed per capita income di®erences. Theoretically, productivity
di®erences necessary to explain cross country income di®erences may be smaller
in an open economy framework, because countries may be able to adjust their
production patterns to their factor endowments through structural transforma-
tion, thereby escaping decreasing returns. Quantitatively, I ¯nd however that
when productivities are country speci¯c, structural change is not important in
explaining cross country income di®erences for most parameter values that im-
ply realistic labor shares because rich countries are too large to specialize in
capital intensive goods and to use their capital endowments more e±ciently.
23I also introduce an overidentifying restriction based on the Heckscher-Ohlin-
Vanek equations to check if calibrated productivities help to explain trade in
factors. I ¯nd that neither the Heckscher-Ohlin model nor the Hall and Jones
model are able to explain the observed trade in factors.
When productivities are factor speci¯c, two types of results emerge: If fac-
tors are substitutes in sectoral production, rich countries are calibrated to have
higher productivities of human capital, while their productivities of physical
capital seem to be lower. This ¯nding is basically a replication of Caselli's
(2005)result. In the model rich countries are not the most capital abundant in
e±ciency units, so that structural change plays no role for explaining income
di®erences. When using the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) equations to evalu-
ate calibrated productivities I ¯nd very poor ¯t of the model. The same poor
¯t is also found for Caselli's model.
When factors are complements at the sectoral level, on the other hand,
structural change does play a role and calibrated productivities ¯t the HOV
equations surprisingly well for some speci¯cations. Rich countries are predicted
to specialize in the production of capital intensive goods and have far higher
productivities of physical capital than poor countries. The productivity of hu-
man capital is inverse U shaped, being low for the poorest countries, reaching its
maximum in the middle income range and becoming again lower in rich coun-
tries. The conclusion is hence that productivity di®erences remain important
even with trade, but they are of a di®erent form. The results also suggest that
a model with country speci¯c technology di®erences may be a too restrictive
picture of the world.
The form of productivity di®erences is not too di®erent from Tre°er (1993)
who ¯nds in a Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek framework that rich countries have both
higher productivities of labor and physical capital. There are, however, impor-
tant di®erences between Tre°er (1993) and this paper. Tre°er (1993) assumes
that conditional factor price equalization holds at the world level and then solves
for the factor productivities that make the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek equations ¯t
exactly. He ¯nds little trade in factors and, as Gabaix shows, with zero measured
factor trade, the formulas for factor productivities in his model converge to the
inverse of the factor-output ratio. In this paper, no assumption of conditional
factor price equalization has been made. I have also shown that it is actually
very unlikely to hold at the level of the world economy. Contrary to Tre°er
(1993) but similar to Tre°er and Zhu (2006) I ¯nd a lot of trade in factors.
There may also be need to explain why the productivity of physical capital
seems to be larger in rich countries. An approach focusing on institutions may
relate capital productivity to factors like ¯nancial development that a®ect the
e±ciency of the distribution of capital within the economy. Another viewpoint
may be to interpret the results as productivity di®erences being larger in capital
intensive sectors than in labor intensive sectors.
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Since both the Productivity Calibration Model with Country Productivities and
the Productivity Calibration Model with Factor Productivities form a large set of
nonlinear equations with inequality constraints I use numerical methods to solve
for the equilibrium prices, quantities and productivities. In order to be able to
solve the problem, I exploit the properties of the Heckscher-Ohlin multiple cone
model. Let me discuss the solution procedure of the two models in turn, starting
with the Productivity Calibration Model with Country Productivities.
Algorithm for solving the Productivity Calibration Problem with Coun-
try Productivities
In this model there are two sectors, call them the K- and the H-sector, with
®K > ®H. With two sectors and two factors production levels of individual
countries are determined which simpli¯es the solution of the problem. Finding
the equilibrium of the world economy amounts to ¯nding the set of countries that
lie in the cone. The CAP is in mathematical terms a nonlinear complementarity
problem. While some numerical algorithms for solving this type of problem exist
(for example the PATH solver developed by Ferris et al.), the size of the problem
makes a direct application of these methods intractable. Instead, I choose to
guess a particular specialization pattern and verify if it is a solution to the CAP.
The algorithm works as follows:
1) Guess a specialization pattern, starting with all countries in the cone.
2) Aggregate all countries that are assumed to be in a cone.
3) Solve the resulting nonlinear system of equations.
4) Whenever a country in the cone produces a negative quantity of a good,
update the guess by setting its production of that good to zero and go to step
2).
5) If the quantities produced are positive for all countries in the cones, check if
with the new guess production of the countries that have been moved from a
cone into a set of countries that specialize satis¯es the condition that ¯rms in
that country would make a loss if they were to produce any of the other goods.
If this is true stop, otherwise go to step 6).
6) If this is not the case, put those countries back into the cone.
7) Iterate on this procedure until convergence.
Alternatively, one can also order countries by Kc=Hc and just check all pos-
sible specialization patterns. This procedure becomes necessary when solving
27models with more than two goods, because production will then only be de-
termined at the level of a cone and not at the country level, where production
is undetermined for countries lying in any cone. In this case the Lens Condi-
tion (Deardor® 1994) can be used to determine whether a set of countries can
constitute a cone.
Algorithm for solving for the Productivity Calibration Equilibrium
with Factor Productivities
In the case in which productivities are factor speci¯c, matters are more
complicated because countries cannot ex ante be ordered according to their
e®ective capital to human capital ratio as
AK;cKc
AH;cHc is only obtained, once the
productivities have been solved for. For this reason I limit my analysis to the
two-goods-case in which individual countries' production levels are determined.
Let there be two sectors, the K- and the H-sector with ®K > ®H. Then there
can be at most one cone of diversi¯cation and countries with extreme
AK;cKc
AH;cHc
will specialize in the K-good or the H-good. The algorithm works quite similarly
to the previous case:
1) Guess a specialization pattern starting with the guess that all countries are
in the cone.
2) If for any country the production of a good under this specialization pattern
is negative, update the guess by assuming that equilibrium production of this
particular good in that country is zero.
3) Check if under the new guess ¯rms in all countries that specialize would make
a loss in producing the other good at equilibrium prices of this specialization
pattern. If not put those countries back into the cone.
4) Repeat steps 2) and 3) until convergence, i.e. until a production pattern is
found such that all equilibrium prices and quantities are strictly positive and it
would not pay for specializing countries to produce the other good.

















































































































Productivity in Hall and Jones´ World
Figure 1: TFP in Hall & Jones' world
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Physical capital productivity in Caselli´s World
Figure 2: AK in Caselli's world for ² = 0:8













































































KEN NER CAF GMB
MWI
TGO

























Human capital productivity in Caselli´s World
Figure 3: AH in Caselli's world for ² = 0:8








































































































Share of Labor in total income
Figure 4: Labor Share
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Figure 5: unskilled wages
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Figure 6: rental rates


















































































































Productivity in Open Economy
Figure 7: ®H = 0:001;®K = 0:999;² = 1;¾H = 0:2;¾K = 0:8
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Figure 8: ®H = 0:001;®K = 0:999;² = 1;¾H = 0:2;¾K = 0:8

















































































































Productivity in Open Economy
Figure 9: ®H = 0:3;®K = 0:4;² = 1;¾H = 0:2;¾K = 0:8















PAK EGY BGD COG LKA BOL CMR NPL ZMB LSO IND CHN SEN KEN NER CAF GMB MWI TGO MLI GHA BEN HTI SLE RWA ZAR MOZ ETH UGA













Figure 10: ®H = 0:3;®K = 0:4;² = 1;¾H = 0:2;¾K = 0:8
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Human capital productivity in open economy
Figure 11: ®H = 0:1;®K = 0:9;² = 1:5;¾H = 0:5
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Physical capital productivity in open economy
Figure 12: ®H = 0:1;®K = 0:9;² = 1:5;¾H = 0:5

























Relative capital abundance in efficiency units
Figure 13: ®H = 0:1;®K = 0:9;² = 1:5;¾H = 0:5










































































































Human capital productivity in open economy
Figure 14: ®H = 0:5;®K = 0:6;² = 1:2;¾H = 0:5




























































































Physical capital productivity in open economy
Figure 15: ®H = 0:5;®K = 0:6;² = 1:2;¾H = 0:5























Relative capital abundance in efficiency units
Figure 16: ®H = 0:5;®K = 0:6;² = 1:2;¾H = 0:5







































































































Human capital productivity in open economy
Figure 17: ®H = 0:2;®K = 0:8;² = 0:6;¾H = 0:4

























































































Physical capital productivity in open economy
Figure 18: ®H = 0:2;®K = 0:8;² = 0:6;¾H = 0:4






















Relative capital abundance in efficiency units
Figure 19: ®H = 0:2;®K = 0:8;² = 0:6;¾H = 0:4
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Human capital productivity in open economy
Figure 20: ®H = 0:1;®K = 0:6;² = 0:8;¾H = 0:4





























ISR GBR NZL HKG IRL CYP KOR BRA VENARG IRN MEX HUN BRB TWN TUN MYS BWA URY THA TTO ECU ZAF MUS TUR CHL PER CRI ROM PAN JOR FJI PRYSYR JAM DOM GUY GTM COL PNG NIC ZWEIDN SLV PHL HND PAK EGY BGD COG LKA BOL CMR NPL ZMB LSO IND CHN SEN KEN NER CAF GMB MWI TGO MLI GHA BEN HTI SLE RWA ZAR MOZ ETH UGA



















Physical capital productivity in open economy
Figure 21: ®H = 0:1;®K = 0:6;² = 0:8;¾H = 0:4






















Relative capital abundance in efficiency units
Figure 22: ®H = 0:1;®K = 0:6;² = 0:8;¾H = 0:4
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